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The Role of Institutional Investors in Voting: Evidence from the Securities Lending Market 
 
Understanding the preferences of institutional investors regarding governance is important for 
firms trying to attract new investors as well as for policy makers considering the regulation of 
different governance mechanisms. However, the mechanisms used by institutional investors to 
impact corporate governance tend to be private and difficult to study.   
One key governance mechanism through which institutional investors can exert influence 
is the proxy voting process. In this paper, we use the unique setting of the securities lending market 
to study the conditions that prompt institutional investors to influence firm-level governance and 
the extent to which investors use the proxy voting process to exercise their opinions. Most large 
pension funds, mutual funds, and other institutional investors have a lending program and consider 
it to be an important source of revenue, with estimates of $800 million in annual revenue for 
pension funds alone (Grene (2010)). Equity lending transfers voting rights to the borrower, 
typically hedge funds, and therefore lenders cannot vote shares that are on loan on the voting record 
date.1 Hence, institutions must decide whether to recall shares or make shares available for 
borrowing for an associated fee and the transfer of voting rights. 
Our study uses a comprehensive daily data set comprised of lendable supply, shares on 
loan, and the associated borrowing fee for the period 2007-2009. Lendable supply measures the 
shares made available to borrow by investors with long positions in the stock, and on loan measures 
borrowing demand, which is the quantity actually lent out. We find a marked reduction in the 
lendable supply prior to the proxy record date and an increase in borrowing demand and fees 
around the record date. Furthermore, lendable supply returns to normal levels immediately after 
the record date, consistent with institutions restricting and/or recalling their loaned shares to 
exercise their voting rights and resuming lending immediately after the record date. 
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We make five contributions. First, our results illustrate that institutional investors value the 
right to vote. Analyzing the lendable supply dynamics of the equity lending market around voting 
record dates reveals that institutional investors recall shares to retain voting rights.2 This finding 
shows that institutional investors value their vote and use the proxy process as an important 
channel for affecting corporate governance. In addition, we show that borrowing demand and fee 
increase around the record day. Second, we find that institutional investors do not all value their 
voting rights in the same way, with considerable heterogeneity in the preferences. Third, we show 
that the decision to recall shares on the voting record date also varies based on firm and proposal 
characteristics, which typically affect the value of control rights. Fourth, we propose a metric to 
quantify the value of the vote and find that lenders of shares place a higher value on their vote than 
borrowers.  Finally, we show that share recall is associated with less support for management in 
the subsequent voting outcome.  
 The heterogeneity in recall of shares shows that institutional investors systematically differ 
in their desire to exert governance via proxy voting. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
model the blockholder’s free-rider problem and show that the willingness of a shareholder to 
intervene will increase with the size of their stake, the value creation stemming from such 
intervention, but decrease with the cost of monitoring.3 Consequently, institutional investors 
should not be expected to recall shares en-masse on all record dates. The recall by institutional 
investors should differ along several dimensions including their ownership stake, investment 
philosophy, investment time horizon, fiduciary responsibility, ability or incentives to engage with 
management, and/or invest in private information required for effective monitoring (e.g., Maug 
(1998), Kahn and Winton (1998) and Edmans (2009)). As an empirical example, Matvos and 
Ostrovsky (2010) find systematic heterogeneity in voting behavior even across mutual funds.  
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While we do not know the identity of the lenders and the borrowers, we study the 
heterogeneity in investors’ voting preferences by observing the differences in recall between firms 
that have a higher proportion of ownership by certain types of investors. We classify institutional 
ownership based on categories used previously in the literature (e.g., Bushee (1998, 2001), Bushee 
and Goodman (2007), and Chen, Harford, and Li (2007)) and examine blockholdings in aggregate, 
since these investors should have the greatest incentive to intervene through the proxy process 
(Maug (1998)), and those held by four types of investors: mutual funds, banks and insurance 
companies, pensions and endowments, and long-term investors. For aggregate blockholdings and 
each of the four categories, we find that the recall/restriction in lendable supply is significantly 
higher for firms with higher ownership relative to firms with low ownership. When examining 
borrowing demand, the difference is never statistically significant. Our results provide insights 
into the preferences of institutional investors, and suggest that institutional investors do not all 
have the same motivation to be active in corporate governance.   
We also examine asymmetric changes in lendable supply and borrowing demand based on 
underlying firm characteristics and types of proposal on the ballot. Firms with poor performance, 
weaker governance, and smaller size exhibit higher recall of shares on the record date. 
Additionally, recall is higher for record dates associated with meetings that have important 
proposals on the ballot related to non-routine items, compensation, anti-takeover, and corporate 
control. For example, the recall effect is almost 40% higher for record dates with corporate control-
related proposals than those without. These results support the hypothesis that shareholders value 
the vote and are keener to vote when it is more “important” to do so. 
When we examine the subsequent vote outcome, we find that higher recall of lendable 
supply is associated with less support for management proposals, such as those relating to 
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compensation and corporate control, and more support for shareholder proposals. In additional 
tests, we focus on the voting behavior of mutual funds, since these institutional investors provide 
a large fraction of lendable supply. Mutual funds are significantly less likely to vote in favor of 
contentious proposals where recall in lendable supply is greater and the proxy advisory firm ISS 
recommends voting against the proposal. These results on mutual fund voting address any concern 
that recall could be negatively associated with support because institutions recall shares to vote 
with management when support for management is low.  
There are several reasons why examining recall in the lending market, as opposed to the 
borrowing fee, improves our understanding about institutional investor voting preferences. 
Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2013) show that the supply of lendable shares is essentially 
flat in the equity lending market, and Prado, Saffi and Sturgess (2014) document that this market 
clears with high levels of slack lendable supply for the average firm. Therefore, borrowing fee can 
be insensitive to both changes in demand and supply. Consequently, examining changes in the 
borrowing fee alone may underestimate the value of the vote, and could even result in concluding 
that the value of the vote is close to zero. To isolate record date effects due to changes in 
preferences for supplying shares from changes due to demand-side effects, we use an instrumental 
variables setup. One of our major contributions is to show that it is important to analyze both the 
lendable supply and the loan demand side of the market.  
 The issues we examine are particularly relevant for a period that has seen increased 
emphasis on both shareholder activism and proxy voting. Voting provides an important mechanism 
for shareholders to affect firm-level corporate governance and policies. The paper proceeds as 
follows. Section I provides a literature review. Section II provides background on the securities 
lending market. Section III describes the data on proxy voting, securities lending, and other firm-
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level corporate attributes. In Section IV, we discuss our methodology and identification strategy. 
Section V contains the main empirical results. Section VI presents results of our empirical findings 
on voting outcomes and the role of lendable supply. Section VII concludes. 
I.  Literature Review 
Prior research has attempted to examine the preferences of institutional investors based on 
inferences of corporate governance attributes deemed important to institutional investors.  Gillan 
and Starks (2000) study the effectiveness of shareholder activism in the U.S. Other studies have 
found that institutional investors affect CEO turnover (Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) and 
Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012)), anti-takeover amendments (Brickley, Lease, and Smith 
(1988)), executive compensation (Hartzell and Starks (2003)), and mergers (Gaspar, Massa, and 
Matos (2005) and Chen, Harford, and Li (2007)). In an analysis of 23 countries, Aggarwal, Erel, 
Ferreira, and Matos (2011) find that changes in institutional ownership are positively associated 
with subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Cuñat, Gine and 
Guadalupe (2012) show that passing a governance provision is associated with an increase in 
shareholder value, and more so when proposals are sponsored by institutions.  
Maug (1998) and Kahn and Winton (1998) show how large stakes bias investors towards 
more shareholder activism. Edmans (2009) argues that the effectiveness of activism depends on 
the threat to sell shares and exit the firm, which in turn is greater for investors with larger stakes. 
Empirically Gillan and Starks (2000) examine the reaction of different types of shareholders to 
proposals through their voting behavior. Duan and Jiao (2014) show that mutual funds with smaller 
ownership blocks and shorter investment horizons are more likely to exit rather than vote against 
management. Bushee, Carter and Gerakos (2013) show that institutional preferences about 
governance and voting vary based on several factors including investment philosophy and 
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fiduciary responsibility. Preferences may also depend on other factors such as investment horizon 
and economic stakes.  
 In a survey of institutional investors, McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2011) find that 
corporate governance is important to institutional investors, and many institutions are willing to 
engage in shareholder activism via the proxy process. Recent papers such as Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, 
and Thomas (2008); Clifford (2008); and Klein and Zur (2009) study activism by individual funds, 
such as pension funds or hedge funds. Fos (2011) shows that proxy contests play a role in 
disciplining managers, while Gantchev (2013) finds that proxy contests are costly and that 
monitoring costs wipe out activist returns, on average. Illiev and Lowry (2013) conclude that 
certain types of funds invest considerable resources examining firm-level governance issues, and 
then voting accordingly. 
Some controversy exists in the literature regarding how changes in the supply and demand 
for lending shares around the record date affect the borrowing fee and what these changes imply 
in terms of the value of a vote. Christoffersen, Géczy, Musto, and Reed (2007) use 1998-1999 data 
from a large lending agent to examine borrowing demand and fees aspects of the securities lending 
market around a proxy vote. They find a marginally significant increase in borrowing fee around 
the proxy record date. The authors conclude that the price of a vote is zero because investors are 
not selling their votes but willingly letting them go, and speculate that this result is due to 
information asymmetry. Examining the change in fee alone, we find that fee increases by two basis 
points on the record date, approximately three times as large as the value found by Christoffersen, 
Géczy, Musto, and Reed (2007). Using option prices, Kalay, Karakas, and Pant (2014), find the 
value of voting rights for the average firm to be 0.16% of the stock price with an average option 
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maturity of 38 days. Moser, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2013) examine securities lending activity 
around proxy voting record date for potential abuse and empty voting. 
II.  Securities Lending Market 
 Securities lending is a transaction in which the beneficial owner of the securities, normally 
a large institutional investor such as a pension fund or mutual fund, agrees to lend its securities to 
a borrower, such as a hedge fund, in exchange for collateral consisting of cash and/or other 
securities.4 Although lenders refer to these shares as being “on loan”, the lender actually transfers 
ownership and voting rights. Shares may be borrowed for a variety of reasons, including short 
selling, or for trading strategies such as convertible bond arbitrage and dividend tax-arbitrage, and 
possibly for empty voting.5 The lender earns a spread by investing the collateral in low-risk short-
term securities. In a typical U.S. loan, the collateral is 102% on domestic securities and 105% for 
international securities. The increased interest in proxy voting and securities lending has resulted 
in fund boards now paying attention not only to the fee received from a securities lending program 
but also to whether the securities are being loaned to “responsible” borrowers. According to a 
survey of institutional investors by ISS, 37.9% of the respondents stated that a formal policy on 
securities lending is part of their proxy voting policy.6 Some funds require a total recall of shares, 
while others weigh the lost revenue against the benefits of voting on a case-by-case basis. Below, 
we provide some examples from funds’ proxy voting guidelines.  
Putnam Funds 
“The funds’ have requested that their securities lending agent recall each domestic issuer’s 
voting securities that are on loan, in advance of the record date for the issuer’s shareholder 
meetings, so that the funds may vote at the meetings.” 7 
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TIAA-CREF 
“Even after we lend the securities of a portfolio company, we continue to monitor whether 
income from lending fees is of greater value than the voting rights that have passed to the borrower. 
Using the factors set forth in our policy, we conduct an analysis of the relative value of lending 
fees versus voting rights in any given situation. We will recall shares when we believe the exercise 
of voting rights may be necessary to maximize the long-term value of our investments despite the 
loss of lending fee revenue.” 8 
 
The SEC requires funds to recall shares for “material” events but has not defined materiality. 
In a survey by ISS, 92.3% of the respondents indicated that mergers and acquisitions were the 
most important reason to recall shares.9 One of the challenges to recalling shares is that 
shareholders typically do not receive the proxy material until after the record date. However, in 
order to vote, institutions must recall the shares by the record date.  
III. Data 
A. Securities Lending Descriptive Statistics 
We obtain a proprietary equity lending data set from Data Explorers (now Markit) for the 
period January 2007 to December 2009. They collect this information daily from 125 large 
custodians and 32 prime brokers in the securities lending industry. Our data covers more than 85% 
of the securities lending market. While there are 4,333 firms in the equity lending sample, the 
proxy voting data limits the analysis to the constituents of the Russell 3000 index. As of December 
2009, there was $1.55 trillion available to lend, out of which $113 billion was actually lent out and 
would be considered as being on loan. Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) provide a detailed description 
of the data. 
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The main dependent variables in our study are defined as follows: lendable supply 
(SUPPLY) is the dollar value of supply available on a given day relative to a firm’s market 
capitalization; loan quantity (ONLOAN) is the dollar value of shares on loan relative to market 
capitalization; utilization rate (UTILIZATION) is ONLOAN divided by SUPPLY; and borrowing 
fee (FEE) is the average transaction-weighted rate reported by Data Explorers and expressed in 
basis points (bps) per annum. Firms that have a fee greater than 100 basis points (1%) are 
commonly considered to be SPECIAL. Such firms are more closely watched by investors and are 
more expensive to borrow. 
In Table 1, we present descriptive statistics for the equity lending market. On average, 
23.78% of a firm’s market capitalization is available for lending, with 4.06% being on loan and 
resulting in a utilization rate of 17.78%. The minimum and maximum values of SUPPLY 
(winsorized at the 1% level) are 1.65% and 48.57%, respectively. ONLOAN varies from a high of 
20.49% to a low of 0.01%. Some firms are heavily borrowed while others are not borrowed at all. 
UTILIZATION is as high as 69% in our sample.  
[Table 1 around here] 
The mean annualized fee is 48.3 bps, implying that it is very cheap, on average, to borrow 
shares. However, this cost can quickly rise for firms in high demand reaching a maximum of 1,114 
bps in our winsorized sample. About 9% of the firms have a fee greater than 100 basis points and 
are considered to be “on special”. The mean and median number of days for which loans are 
outstanding is 16 days and one day, respectively. Most loans are “open ended” and rolled over 
every day without a specific maturity date. 
Figure 1 plots lendable supply, loan demand, utilization, and borrowing fees for the period 
starting 30 days before the record date and ending 30 days after the record date. We define the 
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record date (day 0) as the event date. For our 7,415 voting record dates, the average time between 
the record date and the shareholder meeting is 53 days. The supply of shares available to lend as a 
fraction of market capitalization starts to decrease about 20 days before a vote and is at its lowest 
point on day 0, the record date. On average, SUPPLY is equal to 24.09% on day -30 and reduces 
to 22.16% by the record date. This drop in supply is consistent with institutions restricting or 
recalling their shares at the time of a vote. On the first day after the record date, SUPPLY returns 
to pre-event levels in line with institutions not wanting to lose revenue from lending. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
The results suggest that institutions start restricting supply in advance of the proxy record 
date to ensure that shares can be recalled and that they can exercise the vote. In practice, institutions 
are generally advised to allow two weeks for a recall prior to a proxy vote, and possibly longer if 
the firm is “special”. Consistent with industry practice, we find that the drop in lendable supply 
starts to occur about two weeks before the record.10 Institutions might also recall shares in advance 
to provide sufficient notice to borrowers, thus alleviating possible problems for borrowers to find 
shares and improving an institution’s reputation as a stable and reliable lender.11 
Examining the plot for borrowing demand (ONLOAN) shows a small increase around the 
record date. On day -30, on average, 4.10% of a firm’s market capitalization is on loan, and by the 
record date it grows to 4.13%, increasing by only 0.03% of a firm’s market capitalization. Finally, 
UTILIZATION and FEE both increase in the 20 days prior to the record date. This result adds 
insight to Blocher, Reed and Van Wesep (2013), who argue that shifts in supply matters only for 
firms on special by revealing that supply shifts become important even at relatively low levels of 
utilization.  
B. Other Firm-Level Data 
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We use CRSP to obtain share price (PRICE), market capitalization (SIZE), turnover 
(TURNOVER), and bid-ask spread (SPREAD). We use only common shares with price over $1, 
and further merge the data to Compustat and collect data on book equity (EQUITY) to calculate 
the book-to-market equity ratio (BM). We exclude closed-end funds, American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs) and real estate investment trusts (REITs). We obtain ownership data from the 
Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum database on SEC 13F filings. The 13F filings must be reported 
on a quarterly basis by all investment companies and professional money managers with assets 
over $100 million under management. For each firm, we calculate total institutional ownership as 
a percentage of market capitalization (INST) and institutional ownership concentration (INST 
CONC), measured as the Hirschman-Herfindahl index normalized between zero and one. We use 
firm-level corporate governance index GOV41 as in Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011). 
GOV41 assigns a value of one to each of the 41 governance attributes if the company meets 
minimally acceptable governance guidelines on that attribute and zero otherwise. We classify 
institutional ownership into five groups: (1) all 5% or more blockholders; (2) bank blockholders 
includes banks and insurance companies; (3) mutual funds blockholders includes investment 
companies; (4) pensions and endowments; and (5) long term blockholders are those that hold their 
stake for more than one year. 12, 13 
C. Proxy Voting Descriptive Statistics 
Proxy voting analysis examines 56,220 proposals for 7,415 record-dates obtained from 
ISS. The proxy voting data cover the Russell 3000 index constituents and include proposal-level 
characteristics such as proposal description, sponsor, management’s recommendation, ISS’s 
recommendation, threshold for the proposal to pass, votes cast, and voting result. 
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We present proxy voting characteristics in Panel A of Table 3. On average, 86.62% of votes 
are cast on proxy proposals, with 91.86% of those votes being in favor and only 7.54% against. 
This overwhelming majority in favor of proposals is reflected in the 70.16% vote margin by which 
they pass. We create different categories of proposals, with the explicit aim of exploring those that 
might be considered as contentious, based on disagreement between different parties, and those 
that are associated with significant events. First, we classify proposals as routine and non-routine. 
NYSE Rule 452 outlines non-routine proxy proposals as those in which broker voting is not 
allowed. Examples include proposals relating to anti-takeover provisions, stock capitalization and 
mergers. Second, we examine proposals relating specifically to anti-takeover provisions (G-
INDEX) included in the G-Index developed by Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick (2003), compensation 
proposals (COMP), and those that relate to mergers/proxy contests (CORP CONTROL). 
In Panel B of Table 3 we describe the voting outcome of non-routine proposals, which 
comprise 12.25% of the total sample. These proposals have almost three times more votes cast 
against the proposal than found for the total sample. Almost 60% of non-routine proposals are 
related to compensation. Shareholder-sponsored proposals are a much smaller subset (only 
25.56%) and usually fail to pass, receiving an average of 40% of FOR votes, although when ISS 
is in favor of the proposal the average proportion of FOR votes increase to 46.17%. Examples of 
shareholder-sponsored proposals include Say on Pay; requests that the firm provide cumulative 
voting; reduce supermajority voting; require independent chairman of board; require a majority 
vote for the election of directors; and declassify the board of directors. We also provide descriptive 
statistics on non-routine proposals that are likely to attract most attention from investors. Proposals 
relating to compensation, anti-takeover, and corporate control receive far more negative votes than 
the average for all proposals discussed earlier. 
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[Table 3 around here] 
IV. Methodology 
A. Instrumental Variables Framework 
Our empirical strategy estimates quantity variables (i.e., SUPPLY or ONLOAN) as a 
function of price (FEE), a record date dummy (RDATE), and other controls. We employ the 
instrumental variables estimator developed by Angrist, Graddy and Imbens (2000) to infer the 
price sensitivity of SUPPLY and ONLOAN. Kolasinski, Reed and Ringgenberg (2013) use a similar 
approach to estimate how the supply schedule varies with proxies for searching frictions in the 
equity lending market. If a restriction in supply results in a higher fee, and these higher prices 
result in lower demand, it is relatively straightforward to show that standard OLS estimates that 
ignore endogeneity will result in downward bias in estimates for record date demand shifts. 
Similarly, ignoring endogeneity can also lead to a downward bias in lendable supply shifts at the 
record date due to changes in demand. Therefore, we estimate the following IV regression for 
lendable supply (SUPPLY) in the (-30, +30) days period around the record date: 
1𝑠𝑡  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒:         𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐹1 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐹1 + 𝛾𝐹1𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜃2
𝐹1𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿
𝐹1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝐹1               (1) 
2𝑛𝑑  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒: 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖
𝑆 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑆 + 𝛾𝑆𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1
𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2
𝑆𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + +𝛿
𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑆 .          (2) 
For borrowing demand (ONLOAN) we estimate:  
1𝑠𝑡  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒:            𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐹2 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐹2 + 𝛾𝐹2𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜃2
𝐹2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿
𝐹2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝐹2,               (3) 
2𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒: 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐷 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐷 + 𝛾𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2
𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿
𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐷 ,        (4) 
where INSTRUD and INSTRUS are the exogenous instruments used to identify FEE in the second 
stage for each of the two quantity variables (i.e., ONLOAN and SUPPLY),  𝛼𝑖  and 𝛼𝑡  are firm and 
year fixed effects respectively, β2 represents the elasticity on the record date and γ represents the 
shift in quantity on the record date.14 We include firm and year fixed effects to ensure robustness 
to heteroskedasticity as well common year-specific shocks. 
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The estimates above compare record date shifts in lendable supply and borrowing demand 
with non-record date levels for the same firm. We capture not only the recall in lendable supply and 
increase in borrowing demand on the record date (𝛾𝑆 and 𝛾𝐷) but also changes in the fee-elasticity of 
SUPPLY and ONLOAN on the record date (𝛽2
𝑆 and 𝛽2
𝐷).15 Employing an IV framework to examine 
lendable supply, which measures the quantity of shares made available to borrow, and borrowing 
demand, which measures the quantity of shares borrowed, at the record date is similar to that used in 
the labor market.16 Wages are equivalent to lending fees (FEE), the employment rate is equivalent to 
loan demand (ONLOAN), and the size of the labor force is equivalent to lendable supply (SUPPLY). 
For example, Eissa and Liebman (1996) study how changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
affects labor force participation and hours worked of single mothers. In our context, the RDATE 
variable is equivalent to a dummy controlling for EITC tax change in 1986, while SUPPLY is 
equivalent to labor market participation. These tax changes are expected to not only to affect the level 
of quantity supplied (i.e., SUPPLY in our case) but also the impact of wages on participation rates 
(i.e., similar to our estimates for the RDATE*FEE coefficient). 
B. Choice of Instruments 
We start by introducing the instruments necessary to implement the empirical strategy 
described earlier. Identification requires finding instruments that are exogenously related to FEE 
but unrelated to the error term in the SUPPLY and ONLOAN equations. For example, in  equation 
(4) for ONLOAN we need variables that affect FEE but not demand, such that we can find 
estimated 𝐹𝐸?̂? and 𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝐸̂  values that are uncorrelated with the error term 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐷 . More 
specifically, we instrument demand to map out changes in lendable supply (i.e., equations (1) and 
(2)) and instrument lendable supply to map out changes in borrowing demand to control for the 
endogeneity between quantity and price (i.e., equations (3) and (4)). 
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This approach requires valid instruments that satisfy the exclusion restriction, that is, the 
instrument must not have any direct impact on the dependent variable or through omitted variables. 
Thus, we need to identify variables that affect FEE through changes in ONLOAN (SUPPLY) but 
are unrelated to SUPPLY (ONLOAN). 
To identify SUPPLY, we initially consider the following variables that capture demand-
related shocks to FEE: hedging demand, earnings surprise, and discretionary accruals. Hedging 
Demand is proposed by Hwang, Liu and Xu (2013), who argue that short selling can help correct 
under-pricing of firms by facilitating the hedging of industry risk. If other firms in the same 
industry become under-valued, arbitrageurs should purchase the under-valued firms and short 
substitute securities. Thus, we expect the demand for shorting stock i to be high when the demand 
for going long shares of peers, j, is high. Underpricing is measured as low relative cumulative 
returns in the previous year, where relative returns are defined as the equal-weighted cumulative 
return in the past 252 days of related firms (excluding the firm’s own returns) with the same four-
digit GICS industry classification code.  
Our second instrument is the standardized unexpected earnings measure, SUE, defined as 
the last quarter’s earnings surprise relative to analysts’ median earnings forecasts (Livnat and 
Mendenhall (2006)). Christophe, Ferri and Angel (2004) show that short interest in periods without 
earnings announcements is higher for stocks with low SUE, leading us to expect that demand is 
negatively related to SUE. Furthermore, short selling does not increase prior to earnings 
announcements. Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) show that high-turnover institutional investors 
trade to exploit post earnings announcement drift, but that “dedicated” and “quasi-indexing” 
institutions, both long-horizon investors, do not. Hence, we do not expect that variation in SUE 
will affect equity lendable supply via changes in the portfolio of long-term institutions.  
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Finally, following Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2013), we consider discretionary 
accruals, ACCRUALS, as computed in Sloan (1996), as a potential instrument. Discretionary 
accruals constitute a decision by management to shift earnings from one period to another, and are 
therefore temporary in nature. Further, they tend to be short-term and prior literature finds that 
short selling is positively related to discretionary accruals (e.g., Kolasinski et al (2007)). 
To identify ONLOAN, we consider two variables to instrument FEE that should be 
unrelated to loan demand: passive ownership (PASSIVE) and institutional ownership concentration 
(INST CONC). Passive ownership is defined as the fraction of the firm held by funds classifying 
themselves as index funds, as reported to the SEC on the N-SAR form (see Evans, Ferreira and 
Prado (2013)). These funds comprise passive investors that track a benchmark index and have 
long-term horizons that can earn additional income by lending their stock holdings. D’Avolio 
(2002) describes how “it is the passive indexers who participate most extensively in their 
custodian’s lending program”. Evans, Ferreira and Prado (2013) report that most index funds in 
their sample can and do lend their shares, while Prado, Saffi and Sturgess (2014) show that index 
fund ownership explains SUPPLY over and above total institutional ownership. Given their passive 
strategies, it is unlikely that passive funds are concerned with short-term fluctuations in stock 
prices and consequently, the demand for shorting (ONLOAN), making it a suitable instrument. 
Stock holdings of these funds are obtained from Morningstar’s holdings data and aggregated for 
each firm on a given quarter.  
The second instrument we employ is ownership concentration (INST CONC), measured 
using the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. Prado, Saffi and Sturgess (2014) show that institutional 
ownership concentration is an important determinant of SUPPLY even after controlling for total 
ownership. A more concentrated ownership will result in larger shareholders having more power 
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and more interest in impacting lendable supply. If short sale constraints lead to overpricing as in 
Miller (1977), shareholders can try to limit supply to support prices of their own shares. Hence, 
more concentrated owners may prefer not to lend stock. Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2013) 
argue that short sales strategies have short horizons. Thus if concentrated ownership is long-term 
in terms of investment horizon, it should not be affected by demand for loans in the short term, 
making it a candidate instrument for SUPPLY. 
V. Empirical Results 
A. Securities Lending Market and Fee 
We first examine the patterns in lendable supply and borrowing demand conditioning on 
borrowing fee. The evidence in Table 2 illustrates potential issues from ignoring endogeneity and 
focusing on change in fee alone in estimating the value of the vote. We split the sample of firms 
into those that are cheap to borrow versus those that “On Special” (i.e., those with borrowing fee 
greater than 100 bps at t=-30). We also show statistics for companies that are extremely expensive 
to borrow and have fees above 1,000 bps at t=-30. Of the 7,415 record dates only 79 are associated 
with firms that have borrowing fees above 1,000 bps. Panel A of Table 2 reports averages of equity 
lending variables at t=-30. The average lendable supply as percentage of market capitalization is 
14.52% for firms On Special relative to 25.02% for firms that are not. Borrowing demand is also 
higher for the On Special group. The lower supply and higher demand results in a much higher 
annualized fee of 429 bps for the On Special group, compared with a fee of 9.30 bps for the other 
group. If investors incorporate the cost of borrowing into the decision to lend or borrow then we 
expect different record date behavior between the high fee and low fee groups. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the change in lendable supply and borrowing demand on the 
record date compared with the average for the (-30,+30) window excluding the record date. The 
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lendable supply of the On Special group changes by less when compared with the non-special 
firms both in absolute terms and percentage terms. This implies that lenders recall/restrict more 
shares when fee is low partly because the potential loss of lending revenue is low. Borrowing 
demand increases for the non-special firms but actually decreases on the record date for the On 
Special group. These descriptive statistics illustrate not only that borrowing fee plays a role in the 
decision to lend/borrow, but also that the change in fee around the record date is not a sufficient 
proxy for the value of the vote. Even for On Special firms, the change in fee is small simply 
because of the slack in supply that is typical in the market for equity lending (UTILIZATION is 
near 50% even for FEE>1000 bps split). Combined, these descriptive statistics and the slack in 
supply provide an important explanation for the low value of the vote based on average fee (e.g., 
as reported by Christoffersen, Géczy, Musto, and Reed (2007)). Additionally, the fact that fee 
changes around the record date in response to changes in lendable supply and borrowing demand 
means that one should incorporate borrowing fee in an analysis of equity lending to capture the 
endogenous relationship between quantities and prices. 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
B. OLS Estimations and Falsification Tests  
Having made an a priori case for our instruments, we also conduct formal empirical 
falsification tests of their validity. We examine if our prospective instruments affect FEE but are 
unrelated to SUPPLY (in the case of equations (1) and (2)) or ONLOAN (in the case of equations 
(3) and (4)). If this is the case, we infer that our instruments meet the exclusion restriction. To 
conduct our falsification tests we estimate OLS specifications for lendable supply and borrowing 
demand based on equations (2) and (4), and also for FEE, ignoring endogeneity concerns. We 
  
20 
include firm and year fixed effects, and cluster the standard errors at the year-level to ensure 
robustness to heteroskedasticity as well as serial and cross-sectional correlation. In addition to 
offering evidence on the validity of our instruments, this exercise also offers a glimpse into the 
record date activity in the equity lending market and further illustrates endogeneity concerns. 
For each of the 7,415 record dates, we consider an event window of -30 days to +30 days, 
where t=0 is the proxy voting record date. We include a record date dummy (RDATE) to examine 
whether there is abnormal equity lending market activity on the record date compared to the 30 
days before and after the record date. We follow Prado, Saffi and Sturgess (2014) by including the 
following variables to explain securities lending. To control for ownership, we use INST, 
institutional ownership at the end of the previous quarter measured as a percentage of market 
capitalization. We use the previous quarter’s values of log of market capitalization (SIZE), book-
to-market ratio (BM), turnover (TURNOVER), and bid-ask spread (SPREAD) as explanatory 
variables to control for firm characteristics. We include a dummy for firms with a share price 
below five dollars (PRICE<$5). Similar to Kolasinski, Reed and Ringgenberg (2013), we also 
include short-term momentum (Short-Term Mom) measured as the cumulative return over the five 
previous days and long-term momentum (Long-Term Mom) as the cumulative return over the 
previous 252 trading days.  
In Table 4 we present the OLS estimations for SUPPLY, ONLOAN, and FEE. In column 1 
of Table 4, we test our candidate instruments for ONLOAN, (i.e., Hedging Demand, SUE, and 
ACCRUALS) by examining their effect on SUPPLY. As expected, all three potential instruments 
are unrelated to SUPPLY. Further, the results for ONLOAN in column 3 show that Hedging 
Demand and SUE are negatively related to ONLOAN, and ACCRUALS is positively related to 
ONLOAN. However, examining the results in column 5 we find that while changes in Hedging 
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Demand and SUE affect FEE through ONLOAN, ACCRUALS do not affect FEE. Accordingly, we 
only adopt Hedging Demand and SUE as instruments for ONLOAN. 
[Table 4 around here] 
 Switching attention to our instruments for SUPPLY, if candidate instruments meet the 
exclusion restriction then we should expect them to explain SUPPLY but have no explanatory 
power in the estimation of ONLOAN. Examining the coefficients for PASSIVE and INST CONC 
in columns 1 and 3 we find this to be the case. Further, both changes in PASSIVE and INST CONC 
explain changes in fee through SUPPLY. Altogether, the results of the falsification tests support 
our choice of instruments for both the SUPPLY and ONLOAN equations. 
The OLS estimations in Table 4 also present evidence of changes on the record date. The 
results in columns 1, 3 and 5, show respectively that SUPPLY decreases, ONLOAN increases, and 
FEE increases on the record date (measured by the RDATE coefficient). As a percentage of market 
capitalization, the change in lendable supply of -1.64% is approximately twenty times larger in 
magnitude than the increase in ONLOAN of 0.08%. In terms of economic significance, the record 
date impact on SUPPLY indicates that on average, lendable supply is approximately 7% lower on 
the record date compared with the mean over the [-30,+30] sample window. These findings suggest 
that investors value their vote and therefore recall shares in order to exercise their vote. For 
ONLOAN, the record date increase is around 2% of the mean over the [-30,+30] sample window.17  
Further examination of results for lendable supply, reveal that it is higher when institutional 
ownership (INST) is higher, when institutional ownership is dispersed (INST CONC), for larger 
firms (SIZE), and value firms (BM). Turning to columns 3 and 4, borrowing demand is higher if 
institutional ownership is higher, and for firms that are more liquid. Unsurprisingly, there is a 
negative and significant association between prior performance and borrowing demand. In 
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addition to standard control variables, we include firm-level corporate governance, GOV41. Firms 
with better governance have higher lendable supply and lower borrowing demand. These results 
are consistent with better governance alleviating shareholders’ concerns that share lending will be 
detrimental to the value of their holdings, possibly because good governance deters short-selling.  
 Column 5 of Table 4 reports the results for FEE. The coefficient of RDATE is positive and 
significant at 1%, implying that the fee for borrowing stock increases on the record date. This 
corresponds to a 3.68% increase relative to mean over the [-30, +30] sample window, suggesting 
that the market values voting.  However, the coefficient of 1.776 implies that the value of the vote, 
if measured as the change in fee, is economically small.  
In columns 2 and 4 we also include FEE directly in the OLS estimations of SUPPLY and 
ONLOAN respectively. In the absence of endogeneity concerns one should expect SUPPLY 
(ONLOAN) to be increasing (decreasing) in FEE. However, the estimated coefficients are precisely 
the opposite of this, reflecting instead the endogenous relationship between FEE and quantity. This 
result reinforces our endogeneity concerns highlighted in Section 5.1. The borrowing fee itself 
changes around the record date in response to changes in supply and demand, and therefore one 
should not only incorporate borrowing fee in an analysis of equity lending quantities but also 
address the endogenous relationship between quantity and prices. 
C. Securities Lending around Proxy Record Dates 
Focusing on lendable supply, our empirical strategy estimates SUPPLY as a function of the 
simultaneously determined price (FEE), a record date dummy (RDATE), and the interaction of 
price and the record date dummy (RDATE*FEE), as in specification (2). In the first stage, we 
employ instruments for ONLOAN to estimate exogenous shifts in FEE. The previous estimated 
equation shown in column 5 of Table 4 gives the first stage estimates for FEE. 
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Table 5 displays our main second-stage results for equations (2) and (4) using the 
instrumented fee from the first stage. All equations include the firm characteristics described above 
as control variables, firm and year fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by firm. Columns 1 
and 2 show estimates for SUPPLY with and without the RDATE*FEE coefficient. In column 1, 
the record date effect equals -1.625%, close to the effect presented in Table 4. This recall in 
lendable supply indicates that lenders of shares recall their shares because they value their vote. 
Further, we find that, in general, SUPPLY is insensitive to fee within firm, consistent with a flat 
supply curve. This is in stark contrast to the negative association documented in OLS estimates in 
Table 4. In column 2, we include the interaction term RDATE*FEE. The coefficient on 
RDATE*FEE is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, implying that the recall of 
shares at the record date is sensitive to borrowing fee and that recall is lower if the fee received by 
lenders is higher. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic tests if the instruments are sufficiently correlated 
with the included endogenous regressors. We can safely reject the null that endogenous variables 
are under-identified and obtain similar conclusions using the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic. 
Because there are two or more instruments for lending supply and borrowing demand we also 
perform the J-test of over-identifying restrictions under the assumption that at least one instrument 
is exogenous. Results show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are 
exogenous. 
[Table 5 around here] 
Next, we turn our attention to those participants that borrow stock around the record date. 
Columns 3 and 4 report results for specification (4) using ONLOAN as the dependent variable. The 
positive and statistically significant RDATE coefficients indicate an increase in borrowing demand 
on the record date. However, borrowing demand is lower for firms with a higher borrowing fee. 
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The statistically significant coefficient for RDATE*FEE implies that, for very expensive firms, 
demand may actually decreases on the record date, in line with the descriptive statistics shown for 
ON SPECIAL firms in Table 2. 
Overall, the estimated change in lendable supply on the record date is much larger than the 
change in borrowing demand. These results support the hypothesis that lenders, such as pension 
funds and mutual funds, weigh their vote and the potential lending income before restricting 
lendable supply. The decrease in lendable supply means that investors assign a higher value to 
voting than the potential income they could earn from lending. 
D. Heterogeneity in Preferences of Institutional Investors 
 Institutional investors differ along several dimensions that affect their willingness to exert 
governance through voting (e.g., Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010) and Duan and Jiao (2014)). 
Heterogeneity in voting preferences will depend on several factors including their overall 
investment philosophy, investment horizon, fiduciary responsibility, ability or incentives to 
engage with management and/or invest in private information required for effective monitoring. 
These differences in ownership compositions are likely to be reflected in the equity lending market 
activity on the record date. For example, institutions with larger economic stakes, such as 
blockholders, should be able to better overcome the free-rider problem highlighted by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) and thus have the incentive to both monitor and govern through voting. Therefore, 
we focus on blockholdings when examining the preferences of institutional investors.  
Table 6 presents results on heterogeneity of institutional preferences by examining 
alternative ownership structures. We examine the composition of institutional ownership, rather 
than the composition of institutional lending, because the securities lending data does not provide 
the identity of the lender and borrower. Consequently, our empirical analysis on investor 
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heterogeneity relies on differences in ownership at the firm-level, rather than heterogeneity at the 
lending level. We repeat the IV estimations presented in Table 5 but replace the RDATE dummy 
with RDATE*HIGH and RDATE*LOW. The HIGH (LOW) dummy variable indicates the 
ownership composition in question. Using total blockholdings as an example, HIGH (LOW) takes 
the value of one if institutional blockholding is above (below) the median. This setup allows us to 
examine the change in lendable supply and borrowing demand based on different types of 
institutional investors. We examine total institutional ownership, aggregate blockholdings, and 
those blocks belonging to four types of investors: mutual funds, banks and insurance companies, 
pension funds, and endowments using the classification in Bushee and Goodman (2007), while we 
define the proportion of long-term investors based on Chen, Harford and Li (2007).  
To provide a benchmark, Panel A of Table 6 reports results based on total institutional 
ownership. We find no significant difference in the change in SUPPLY or ONLOAN on record date 
between firms below and above the median. However, this result changes when we focus on 
blockholders in Panel B. Large blockholders have more incentives to monitor the firm, which 
results in greater record date recall. In the lendable supply equation, the coefficient of 
RDATE*HIGH is -2.915 while the coefficient of RDATE*LOW is -1.688, and the difference is 
statistically significant. The negative and significant coefficients imply that both high and low 
blockholders recall shares, but we find the recall to be greater for firms with greater blockholdings.  
In panels C, D and E, we report results using blockholdings held by mutual funds, banks and 
insurance companies, and pension funds and endowments, respectively. These types of 
institutional investors have more fiduciary responsibilities than other types of institutions. Both 
mutual funds and the pension funds and endowments groups are active participants in the securities 
lending market.  Again, we find that larger holdings by these groups of institutions results in higher 
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recall. In Panel F, we show that long-term investors, who are more likely to be interested in 
corporate governance and have incentives to engage with management, recall more of their shares 
on the record date. The results are similar if the high/low categories are based on total ownership 
rather than blockholdings. 
[Table 6 around here] 
In each case, we repeat the analysis for borrowing demand and find that the demand to 
borrow shares increases for each type of investor, however, the difference between high and low 
ownership type is not significant.  
E. Heterogeneity in Firm and Proposal Characteristics 
The benefits of shareholder intervention may vary not only with their individual stake but 
also with the value originating from such intervention. Consequently, recall should also be a 
function of both firm and proposal characteristics. In Table 7, we examine changes in lendable 
supply and borrowing demand on the record date based on several firm characteristics: corporate 
governance, stock returns during the past 12-months, and market capitalization. For each of these 
characteristics, we expect the interest in voting to vary. For example, the value of the vote is likely 
to be greater for firms with weak governance when compared to firms with strong governance. 
Within firm, there may be time-series variation in voting rights. For example, in periods of low 
returns investors may place a higher value on implementing change through voting. Finally, the 
value of the vote might vary with size because the vote may hold more influence in smaller firms 
where ownership is less dispersed. Panel A of Table 7 splits firms into low and high corporate 
governance based on GOV41. Institutional investors prefer not to lend out shares on the record 
date for firms with weak governance. The interaction of RDATE* LOW based on firm-level 
corporate governance is -2.446 and for RDATE* HIGH the coefficient is 
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 -1.727. Both coefficients and the difference are statistically significant. Again, the results suggest 
that on average, the recall of lendable supply occurs for all firms, and is higher for firms with weak 
governance. In the case of firms with weaker governance, institutional investors are even more 
interested in recalling their shares and voting with their voice.  
[Table 7 around here] 
In Panel B, we present splits by low and high monthly returns in the preceding twelve 
months. Share lenders are particularly interested in exercising their vote in firms that are not 
performing well, where they can use the vote to bring about change at the firm. We find that the 
recall is larger for firms that have performed below the median. In Panel C, the sample is split 
based on market capitalization and we find that recall is significantly higher in smaller firms. These 
firms likely face bigger information asymmetry problems and we would expect that lenders would 
have more incentives to exercise their opinions through voting. In all panels, the difference 
between low and high groups is not significant for borrowing demand. 
In Panels D to G we also examine changes in lendable supply and borrowing demand 
around record dates associated with proxy events that are deemed to be more “important” to 
shareholders. We report results using four alternative splits based on the presence of at least one 
of the following types of proposals: non-routine, compensation-related, anti-takeover, and 
corporate control (proxy contests and mergers). We split the sample based on whether the record 
date is associated with a proxy event or not in the ballot. However, we omit firms from both 
subsamples that do not have at least one proxy event in question.  
In Panel D of Table 7, we show results for record dates with and without non-routine 
proposals. Non-routine proxy proposals include proposals relating to anti-takeover provisions, 
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stock capitalization and mergers. For SUPPLY, we find higher recall when at least one non-routine 
proposal is present in the ballot but find no statistical difference for ONLOAN. 
Panel E splits the sample according to the presence of at least one compensation-related 
proposal and yields similar results. With the increased prominence of corporate governance 
concerns, managerial compensation policies have become a focus of investors’ attention and we 
expect it to be reflected into a higher value of the vote. The importance of compensation related 
proxy proposals is revealed in the results. The estimated SUPPLY change on record dates with 
compensation related proposals, -2.608, is 16% more negative than on record dates with those 
proposals. Again, we find no significant difference on the demand side.  
The third group of contentious proposals we consider in Panel F is based on anti-takeover 
provisions (G-INDEX) included in the G-Index developed by Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick (2003). 
We find that record dates with G-INDEX related proposals have higher recalls than non-G-INDEX 
related proposals and the difference is statistically significant.  
Finally, in Panel G of Table 7, we consider record dates with proposals related to corporate 
control by examining proxy contests and mergers. In a proxy contest, shareholders vote to resolve 
a conflict between the firm’s management and board of directors, referred to as “incumbents”, and 
a group of shareholders, referred to as “dissidents”. Some examples of high profile proxy contests 
include Carl Icahn’s efforts to unseat Yahoo’s board in 2008, and Hewlett Packard – Compaq 
merger in 2001. Dissident shareholders can initiate the proxy contest by filing a preliminary proxy 
statement PREC14A and definitive proxy statement in connection with contested solicitations 
DEFC14A. Data on proxy contests are hand-collected and supplemented with data from 
Sharkrepellent.net, an organization that covers proxy fights and activism; for mergers we identify 
proposals for targets and acquirers in the ISS database. The change in SUPPLY on record dates 
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with corporate control related proposals is almost 40% larger than those without those types of 
proposals. For borrowers, the difference in demand between corporate control and non-corporate 
control related proposals is not statistically significant. 
In summary, we show that the value of the vote varies based on type of investor, firm 
characteristics, and proposal types on the lendable supply side. These results provide evidence that 
institutional investors monitor firms and selectively recall shares to vote, and rule out that 
institutional investors recall their shares mechanically for window dressing purposes. 
F. Estimating the Value of the Vote for Institutional Investors 
The results on recall of lendable supply around the record date illustrate that while some 
institutions recall shares to exert governance through voting, other institutions continue to lend 
shares. This has significant implication for estimating the value of the vote using the equity lending 
market: so long as some institutions continue to provide enough shares to meet the demand, the 
recall in supply or an increase in demand may have little impact on borrowing fee. As shown by 
Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2013), and Prado, Saffi and Sturgess (2014) this slack supply 
situation is the norm in this market.  
 In an attempt to provide a meaningful estimate for the value of a vote, we examine the 
change in the borrowing fee on the record date that would offer lenders sufficient compensation to 
continue lending at the same levels observed in non-record date days rather than recall shares.18 
Methodologically, in terms of equation (2) this is equivalent to setting the combined record date 
effect on estimated quantities to zero and solving for fee given the estimated parameters. Therefore, 
we solve 𝛾𝑆 + 𝛽2
𝑆𝐹𝑒𝑒 = 0, such that the value of the vote, VVOTE, is defined as: 
𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 = −
𝛾𝑆
𝛽2
𝑆                     (5) 
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Since VVOTE is determined as a function of estimated coefficients, representing the 
average shift in quantity and price-elasticity across record dates, it is equivalent to the fee required 
to ensure zero recall, relative to non-record date days, for the average stock. Consequently, one 
might interpret VVOTE as the value of the vote for the institution with the highest valuation rather 
than the marginal institution. The non-linear combination of parameters required to estimate 
VVOTE leads us to use the delta method to compute standard errors and test for statistical 
significance. The estimate for 𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 is equal to 267.8 bps in annualized terms (1.06 bps 
per day) with an estimated standard error equal to 119 bps, being significant at the 1% value. We 
find that lenders assign almost twice as much value to votes than borrowers on the record date. 
The fact that investors start to recall their shares around twenty days (Figure 1) before the record 
date affects the economic interpretation of the value of the vote. This implies that lenders are 
willing to give up ((20/252)*267.8/100=) 0.2% of the value of shares available to borrow to vote. 
While our focus is on institutional investors, we can also estimate VVOTE for those 
investors that demand shares around the record date. 𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 is equal to 111.4 bps in 
annualized terms (0.44 bps per day) and has a standard error equal to 17 bps, also significant at the 
1% level. 
The fact that institutions spend time and resources to set up policy, monitor, and selectively 
recall reflects that they care about their vote.19 This is another reason for why the value of the vote 
may not be fully captured by the fee and our estimates are likely a lower bound since they do not 
fully capture these unobservable costs.  
VI. Voting Outcome 
To understand how institutional voting shapes proxy outcomes, in this section we examine 
whether the recall of supply by institutional investors has any impact on the vote outcome at the 
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shareholder meeting. We estimate regressions for the 6,887 non-routine proposals where the 
dependent variable is FOR, the percentage of votes in favor of a proposal.20 For each proposal we 
test if the restriction in lendable supply and the increase in demand around the record date play a 
role on how votes are cast on the subsequent meeting date. Importantly, the meeting date is on 
average 53 days after the record date. If institutions recall lendable supply to exercise their vote, 
then we should expect that voting outcome is associated with recalled supply.  
The independent equity lending variables are the change in lendable supply, ΔSUPPLY, 
and the change in borrowing demand, ΔONLOAN. These changes are based on the average 
lendable supply and on loan during days (t=-30 to -20) to the record date (t=0). We include 
indicator variables for management proposals that management supports and the proxy advisory 
service ISS opposes (DISS), for shareholder-sponsored proposals (DSHR), and for proposals 
relating to compensation (COMP), G-INDEX (G-INDEX), and corporate control (CORP 
CONTROL) that we examined in Section 5. We also interact the change in supply and the change 
in on loan with these characteristics to better understand when equity lending activity is important 
to determine support for a proposal. Further, we include the firm-specific characteristics and 
proposal fixed effects included in the earlier estimations, but omit these for brevity in Table 8. All 
regressions include firm fixed effects, time dummies, and standard errors are double clustered at 
the firm and year levels.  
 In column 1 of Table 8, we present evidence that shows the record date change in lendable 
supply is positively associated with more votes against the proposal. The coefficient of ΔSUPPLY 
of 0.350 implies that a recall in lendable supply (i.e., a decrease in ΔSUPPLY) is negatively 
associated with support for non-routine proposals; however, significance is only at the 10% level. 
We find no relation between borrowing demand and a larger proportion of FOR votes for 
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proposals. Further, shareholder sponsored proposals exhibit 44% less FOR votes, on average, than 
management sponsored proposals for the same firm. However, the significant coefficient of -2.444 
on ΔSUPPLY * DSHR shows that the record date recall in supply is positively associated with 
more votes being cast in favor of shareholder sponsored proposals. 
Next, in column 2, we introduce proposal characteristics and advice from proxy advisory 
services. Consistent with Alexander et al (2010), we find that the recommendations of proxy 
advisors play an important role in the outcome of proposals. In general proposals that ISS 
recommends against management are associated with significantly lower support. Further, the 
significant coefficient of 1.545 on ΔSUPPLY * DISS implies that a higher recall (negative 
ΔSUPPLY) at the record date leads to fewer votes being cast in favor of a proposal if ISS opposes 
management. This is consistent with institutional investors responsibly fulfilling a monitoring role 
whereby they provide prudence on behalf of shareholders.  Switching focus to proposal 
characteristics we find greater support for compensation, G-Index, and corporate control 
proposals. However, where the recall of lendable supply is higher the support for these proposals 
is lower: the coefficients estimated by interacting ΔSUPPLY with these three proposal types are 
all positive and significant. In Section 5 we show that institutional investors placed a higher value 
on voting rights for these types of proposals; here we show that when institutions do recall shares 
they tend to vote against the proposal. This finding is consistent with institutional investors 
providing monitoring of managerial activities via the proxy process. We also find evidence that 
higher borrowing is associated with less support for proposals that ISS recommends against but 
not much for compensation, G-Index, and corporate control.   
[Table 8 around here] 
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The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show indirect evidence that a recall in lendable 
supply is positively associated with votes for shareholder proposals, and against management 
proposals related to compensation, governance and corporate control. An alternative explanation 
is that institutions recall shares to vote with management when support for management is low. 
Because we do not know the identity of the institutions that recall shares, we try to rule out this 
alternative explanation by examining the voting behavior of mutual funds, who are one of the 
largest lenders of shares.  
We obtain data on mutual fund voting behavior reported on SEC Form N-PX. Form N-PX 
identifies all proposals on which the fund has voted portfolio securities and discloses how the fund 
voted on each proposal (the number of shares voted is not required to be disclosed). Our sample 
includes mutual fund voting data for 6,651 individual funds that are part of 308 institutions (mutual 
fund families) for the 3,826 record dates that include non-routine proposals. In total we have 
1,524,290 fund-proposal voting behavior in our sample. In column 3 of Table 8, we examine how 
voting outcome is affected by recall in supply for mutual funds by estimating if the mutual fund 
voted FOR the proposal, where FOR is equal to 100 if the fund voted in favor of the proposal, and 
zero otherwise.21 We repeat the estimation of FOR presented in column 2 but at the mutual fund 
level, and include fund family fixed effects in addition to firm fixed effects to control for fund 
family-level policies on both voting and lendable supply recall. The results show that mutual fund 
voting is associated with support for proposals where there is a greater recall in general. However, 
where ISS recommends against the proposal or the proposal is related to compensation or anti-
takeover provisions a larger recall in supply is associated with less support from mutual funds. 
This result alleviates the concern that mutual funds are recalling shares to vote with management 
when other shareholders are following ISS’s advice and voting against management. 
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Collectively, these results show that institutional investors that choose to retain voting 
rights have a meaningful impact on voting outcomes. While the fewer number of votes in favor of 
proposals may not result in the proposal being rejected, there is evidence that votes recorded 
against proposals have spillover governance effects. Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) and Fischer 
et al. (2009) show that meaningful vote totals against director election proposals, even where the 
proposal passes, are followed by changes in the board, management, or corporate actions within 
the next year.  
VII. Conclusion 
 
The preferences of institutional investors tend to be private and usually cannot be studied 
because they are often conducted behind the scenes. We use the unique setting of the equity lending 
market to observe the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. Lending fee is an 
important source of revenue for many institutional investors and enhances their performance. For 
example, in 2012, Vanguard reported that securities lending increased annual fund returns by more 
than 1 basis point for over 60% of its funds, by more than 5 basis points for nearly a third of funds, 
and by more than 10 basis points for over 15% of funds.22 However, if institutions have loaned out 
their shares on the record date, then they cannot exercise their vote. Hence, institutional investors 
must decide whether to restrict lending and even recall shares already on loan in the event of an 
upcoming vote. Just prior to the proxy record date, we find a significant reduction in lendable 
supply, because institutions restrict or call back their loaned shares in order to vote.  
We find heterogeneity in the recall to vote based on institutional investor composition, firm 
and proposal characteristics. These results show that recall is higher for firms with a higher 
proportion of investors with stronger incentives to monitor and exert governance, for stocks where 
governance is more valuable and for proposals where the returns to governance are likely higher. 
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Finally, to understand how institutional voting shapes proxy outcomes, we examine the subsequent 
vote outcome and find higher recall to be associated with less support for management proposals 
such as those relating to compensation and corporate control, and more support for shareholder 
proposals. Thus our results are consistent with shareholder voting acting as an effective 
governance mechanism, but only when the economic stake is large enough or economic benefit 
great enough to overcome the free-rider problem that arises from the dispersed ownership.  
Overall, our findings imply that institutional investors value their vote and use the proxy 
voting process as an important channel for affecting corporate governance. Our analysis suggests 
policy makers should address several issues related to proxy voting, including the need for 
investors to learn about proxy items before the record date so that they can decide whether to lend 
their shares or not. 
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Figure 1 
Equity Lending Market Activity around Record Date 
 
The figure presents a daily plot of lendable supply, on loan, utilization and loan fees for the period (-30,+30) 
for 7,415 record dates (day t=0 is the proxy voting record date) during the years 2007-2009. SUPPLY is the 
percentage of market capitalization available to lend; ONLOAN is the percentage of market capitalization 
actually borrowed; UTILIZATION is the ratio of ONLOAN to SUPPLY expressed in percentage; FEE is the 
annualized borrowing fees expressed in basis points. In the top panel, SUPPLY is shown on the left-hand 
axis and UTILIZATION is shown on the right-hand axis. In the bottom panel, the left-hand axis shows 
ONLOAN and the right-hand axis shows FEE. 
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Table 1 
Equity Lending Characteristics  
 
The table presents characteristics of the equity lending market around the record dates of Russell 3000 firms from 
2007 to 2009. SUPPLY is the percentage of market capitalization available to lend; ONLOAN measures borrowing 
demand and is the percentage of market capitalization actually borrowed; FEE is the annualized borrowing fee 
expressed in basis points; and UTILIZATION is the ratio of ONLOAN to SUPPLY expressed in percentage. 
SPECIAL includes firms with a borrowing fee in excess of 100 bps. SUPPLY, ONLOAN, and FEE are winsorized 
at 1%. 
 
Equity Lending Characteristics 
 Obs. Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
SUPPLY 7,415 23.78% 24.23% 10.71% 1.65% 48.57% 
ONLOAN 7,415 4.06% 2.63% 4.22% 0.01% 20.49% 
FEE 7,415 48.28 9.90 158.25 -50.84 1113.81 
UTILIZATION 7,415 17.78% 12.59% 16.25% 0.23% 68.90% 
SPECIAL 7,415 9.41% 0.00% 29.48% 0.00% 100.00% 
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Table 2 
Lendable Supply, Borrowing Demand and Fee for Firms “On Special” 
 
Panel A of the table reports the averages of equity lending variables at t=-30 and Panel B reports the percentage 
points change in each lending attribute on the record date compared with the average over the (-30, +30) days 
period (excluding the record date). On Special includes firms with a borrowing fee in excess of 100 bps, measured 
on t=-30. SUPPLY is the percentage of market capitalization available to lend. ONLOAN is the percentage of 
market capitalization actually borrowed; FEE is the annualized borrowing fees expressed in basis points; and 
UTILIZATION is the ratio of ONLOAN to SUPPLY expressed as a percentage. 
 
Panel A: Lendable Supply, Borrowing Demand and Fee at t=-30 
On Special #(Record Dates) SUPPLY ONLOAN FEE UTILIZATION 
No 6,756 25.02% 3.83% 9.30 15.20% 
Yes 659 14.52% 6.85% 428.68 42.96% 
      
FEE>1000 bps 79 12.40% 6.44% 1108.37 50.81% 
 
Panel B: Record Date Change from the Average Level for the Event Window 
On Special #(Record Dates) SUPPLY ONLOAN FEE UTILIZATION 
No 6,756 -1.73% 0.10% 0.92 1.64% 
Yes 659 -0.80% -0.21% 4.45 1.13% 
      
FEE>1000 bps 79 -0.68% -0.29% 5.30 0.63% 
      
Full Sample 7415 -1.91% 0.07% 2.40 1.78% 
 
 
  
  
47 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics – Voting Proposals 
 
The table presents descriptive statistics for 56,220 proxy proposals of Russell 3000 firms in the 2007-2009 period. 
Panel A shows data for all proposals while Panel B shows voting outcome statistics for different types of non-
routine proposals. VOTES CAST is the percentage of the total votes cast relative to shares outstanding. FOR, 
AGAINST, and ABSTAIN are the total number of votes for, against, and abstained for the proposal, respectively, 
relative to the BASE by which the proposal outcome is measured (expressed as a percentage). VOTE MARGIN is 
defined as FOR minus the minimum threshold required for the proposal to pass. Voting outcome variables are 
winsorized at the 1%-level. In Panel B, Obs. refers to the number of proposal observations and RDATE Obs. refers 
to the number of record date proposals (there may be multiple proposals on each record date). NON ROUTINE 
proposals are proposals not relating to operational or uncontested directorships. MGT are management-sponsored 
proposals. SHDR are shareholder-sponsored proposals. G-INDEX, COMP and CORP CONTROL are, 
respectively, dummies for anti-takeover, compensation and merger/proxy contest related proposals. 
 
Panel A: Voting Outcome for All Proposals 
 Obs. Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
VOTES CAST 56,220 86.62% 88.74% 9.49% 37.42% 100% 
FOR 56,220 91.86% 97.37% 14.15% 18.94% 100% 
AGAINST 56,220 7.54% 2.48% 13.25% 0.00% 75% 
ABSTAIN 56,220 0.41% 0.00% 1.56% 0.00% 11.9% 
VOTE MARGIN 56,220 70.16% 87.10% 30.79% -31.37% 100% 
Panel B: Voting Outcome by Proposal Type for Non-Routine Proposals 
 Obs. 
RDATE 
Obs. 
VOTES 
CAST 
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN 
VOTE 
MARGIN 
NON ROUTINE 6,887 3,719 77.65% 73.24% 23.02% 1.86% 23.43% 
- MGT 5,127 3,717 78.82% 84.61% 11.73% 0.97% 35.01% 
- SHDR 1,760 824 74.27% 39.99% 55.91% 4.44% -10.50% 
- COMP 4,024 2,854 77.76% 80.67% 18.02% 1.34% 30.48% 
- G-INDEX 1,190 1,034 79.54% 65.23% 28.19% 1.10% 9.96% 
- CORP CONTROL 588 371 72.31% 80.60% 14.64% 3.53% 51.35% 
 
 
 
 
  
  
48 
Table 4 
Abnormal Lendable Supply, Borrowing Demand and Fees around Proxy Voting Record Dates 
 
The table presents results from an event study on the effect of proxy voting on equity lendable supply, loan demand and 
fees in the (-30, +30) days period around 7,415 voting record dates (record date is t=0). SUPPLY is the percentage of 
market capitalization available to lend. ONLOAN is the percentage of market capitalization actually borrowed and FEE 
is the annualized borrowing fees expressed in basis points. RDATE is a dummy equal to one on the record dates. Control 
variables comprise governance index (GOV41), institutional ownership (INST), concentration of institutional ownership 
as measured by the Herfindahl index (INST CONC), the natural log of market capitalization (SIZE), book to market (BM), 
stock turnover (TURNOVER), bid-ask spread (SPREAD), a small firm dummy (PRICE<$5), and Short-Term Mom and 
Long-Term Mom are defined as the cumulative returns in the previous 5 and 252 days, respectively. All regressions include 
year and firm fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level, presented in parentheses. *** (**,*) 
indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
 
   Dependent Variable 
  SUPPLY ONLOAN FEE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FEE   -0.0011**   0.0034***   
    [0.000]   [0.000]   
RDATE -1.6358*** -1.6337*** 0.0822*** 0.0760*** 1.7755*** 
  [0.036] [0.036] [0.010] [0.010] [0.330] 
INST 22.8365*** 22.9008*** 12.2682*** 12.0799*** 54.6799** 
  [0.896] [0.896] [0.618] [0.598] [23.860] 
SIZE 0.6895*** 0.6940*** 0.2138 0.2004 3.0226 
  [0.202] [0.202] [0.135] [0.132] [5.661] 
BM 0.4482*** 0.4623*** 0.0830 0.0407 9.2589 
  [0.158] [0.160] [0.104] [0.101] [6.134] 
TURNOVER 0.1307*** 0.1339*** 0.3736*** 0.3638*** 2.3021** 
  [0.031] [0.031] [0.022] [0.021] [0.963] 
SPREAD -0.0574 -0.0589 -0.0323 -0.0286 -0.1665 
  [0.040] [0.040] [0.023] [0.022] [1.623] 
PRICE<$5 0.4390** 0.4495** -0.5344*** -0.5662*** 5.0738 
  [0.206] [0.206] [0.135] [0.132] [6.771] 
Short-Term Mom -0.0158*** -0.0158*** -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0207 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.045] 
Long-Term Mom -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0045*** -0.0043*** -0.0357 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.050] 
GOV41 9.8038*** 9.7859*** -7.0214*** -7.0181*** -20.2775 
  [1.875] [1.873] [1.221] [1.204] [41.791] 
PASSIVE 15.9453*** 15.8619*** -0.6034 -0.3855 -72.0027* 
  [1.519] [1.525] [0.962] [0.933] [40.268] 
INST CONC -24.1798*** -23.9192*** -1.6306 -2.3999 246.3017*** 
  [2.614] [2.619] [1.536] [1.483] [82.562] 
Hedging Demand 0.2966 0.2452 -0.0242** -0.0231** -38.7274*** 
  [0.247] [0.247] [0.010] [0.010] [11.901] 
SUE 0.7869 0.4197 -6.2332** -5.0768* -345.9800** 
  [4.447] [4.467] [2.805] [2.668] [154.770] 
ACCRUALS -0.6254 -0.5947 1.5697** 1.4662** 16.2272 
  [1.225] [1.224] [0.730] [0.711] [38.044] 
Constant -3.0902 -3.1017 -1.6785 -1.5455 -3.4367 
  [2.013] [2.011] [1.367] [1.338] [55.918] 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.90 0.90 0.77 078 0.75 
# of Firms 3,053  3,053  3,053  3,053  3,053  
49 
 
Table 5 
Lendable Supply and Borrowing Demand around Voting Record Dates 
 
The table presents our main second stage results using the instrumented fee estimated in the first stage to control for the 
endogeneity of the fee. SUPPLY is the percentage of market capitalization available to lend. ONLOAN is the percentage of 
market capitalization actually borrowed. FEE is the annualized borrowing fee expressed in basis points, RDATE is a variable 
equal to one at record date, zero otherwise. Control variables include institutional ownership (INST), the institutional 
ownership concentration (INST CONC), the natural logarithm of market capitalization (SIZE), book to market (BM), stock 
turnover (TURNOVER), bid-ask spread (SPREAD), a small firm dummy (PRICE<$5), cumulative returns in the previous 5 
days (Short-Term Mom), cumulative returns in the previous 252 days (Long-Term Mom), and the internal governance 
measure (GOV41). Hedging Demand is defined as the equal-weighted cumulative return in the past 252 days of related 
firms with the same four-digit-GICS industry classification. VVOTE is defined as the ratio of between the RDATE and 
RDATE*FEE coefficients as shown in Section 3. The significance of VVOTE is computed using the delta method. All 
regressions include year and firm fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year level, presented in 
parentheses. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
  Dependent Variable 
  SUPPLY ONLOAN 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FEE -0.0061 -0.0056 -0.0045 -0.0045 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
RDATE*FEE   0.0074*   -0.0015*** 
    [0.004]   [0.000] 
RDATE -1.6250*** -1.9874*** 0.0903*** 0.1637*** 
  [0.038] [0.207] [0.016] [0.024] 
INST 23.1808*** 21.4098*** 12.5380*** 12.5378*** 
  [0.960] [0.949] [0.675] [0.675] 
SIZE 0.7046*** 0.9696*** 0.2539* 0.2540* 
  [0.206] [0.203] [0.144] [0.144] 
BM 0.5153*** 0.3795** 0.1124 0.1125 
  [0.182] [0.181] [0.133] [0.133] 
TURNOVER 0.1448*** 0.0932*** 0.3844*** 0.3843*** 
  [0.034] [0.033] [0.028] [0.028] 
SPREAD -0.0585 -0.1390*** -0.0305 -0.0307 
  [0.042] [0.041] [0.027] [0.027] 
PRICE<$5 0.4684** 0.5011** -0.5257*** -0.5260*** 
  [0.210] [0.206] [0.150] [0.150] 
Short-Term Mom -0.0160*** -0.0193*** -0.0028*** -0.0027*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
Long-Term Mom -0.0028 0.0030 -0.0050*** -0.0050*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
GOV41 9.6655*** 2.7658 -7.1928*** -7.1926*** 
  [1.875] [1.848] [1.273] [1.273] 
INST CONC -22.6961*** -22.3641***     
  [3.135] [3.046]     
PASSIVE 15.5213*** 7.1410***     
  [1.670] [1.602]     
Hedging Demand     -0.0262** -0.0262** 
      [0.011] [0.011] 
SUE     -1.6317*** -1.6316*** 
      [0.578] [0.578] 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM  13.54 26.55 9.54 9.92 
P-Value 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.019 
Cragg-Donald Wald F  1727.85 416.89 968.33 484.16 
Sargan-Hansen Statistic 0.145 0.94 1.047 1.21 
P-Value 0.703 0.624 0.306 0.547 
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Table 6 
  Institutional Ownership Composition and Equity Lending Activity on the Record Date 
 
The table reports the coefficients for the RDATE dummy variable using the instrumental variables framework similar to 
Table 5, where RDATE is conditional on below (Low) and above (High) median for several ownership structure 
characteristics. SUPPLY is the percentage of market capitalization available to lend. ONLOAN is the percentage of market 
capitalization actually borrowed. RDATE is a dummy equal to one on the record dates. Panel A uses total institutional 
ownership, Panel B uses blockholders defined as those institutional investors with above 5% of market capitalization, Panel 
C focuses on blockholdings owned by mutual funds, Panel D for those held by banks and insurance companies, Panel E by 
Pension and Endowment Funds, and Panel F for long-term blockholders based on Chen, Harford and Li (2007). Regressions 
include the high/low variable of interest where this is not included in the main specification. All regressions include year 
and firm fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year level. Diff captures the difference between 
High and Low estimates. We report p-values in parentheses. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 
Lending Variable High 
 
Low Diff (P-value) 
Panel A: Institutional Ownership 
SUPPLY 
-1.961*** -2.067*** 0.107 
(0.182) (0.375) (0.613) 
ONLOAN 0.170*** 0.146*** 0.024 
(0.023) (0.033) (0.329) 
Panel B: All Blockholders 
SUPPLY 
-2.915*** -1.688*** -1.227*** 
(0.435) (0.142) (0.000) 
ONLOAN 0.194*** 0.163*** 0.031 
(0.058) (0.023) (0.487) 
Panel C: Mutual Fund Blockholders 
SUPPLY -2.530*** -1.580*** -0.949*** 
 (0.271) (0.159) (0.000) 
ONLOAN 0.161*** 0.169*** -0.008 
 (0.036) (0.023) (0.775) 
Panel D: Bank and Insurance Companies Blockholders 
SUPPLY  -2.279*** -1.803*** -0.476*** 
 (0.229) (0.197) (0.000) 
ONLOAN 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.004 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.839) 
Panel E: Pension and Endowment Blockholdings 
SUPPLY -2.450*** -1.909*** -0.541*** 
 (0.374) (0.184) (0.013) 
ONLOAN 0.209*** 0.164*** 0.045 
 (0.087) (0.024) (0.565) 
Panel F: Long-Term Blockholders (based on Chen et al. (2007)) 
SUPPLY -2.401*** -1.736*** -0.665*** 
 (0.189) (0.332) (0.007) 
ONLOAN 0.155*** 0.172*** -0.017 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.444) 
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Table 7 
Firm Characteristics, Proposal Types and Equity Lending Activity on the Record Date  
 
The table reports the coefficients for the RDATE dummy variable using the instrumental variables framework similar to 
Table 5, with the sample split into below (Low) and above (High) median for several firm characteristics and proposal type. 
SUPPLY is the percentage of market capitalization available to lend. ONLOAN is the percentage of market capitalization 
actually borrowed. RDATE is a dummy equal to one on the record dates. Panel A is based on the GOV41 measure of internal 
corporate governance; Panel B uses cumulative returns in the previous twelve months; Panel C is based on stock market 
capitalization; Panel D is based on non-routine proposals; Panel E on compensation proposals referring to those related to 
managerial compensation policies; Panel F on the G-INDEX of anti-takeover provisions (Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick 
(2003)); and Panel G is based on corporate control proposals defined as those record dates with a proxy contest or merger. 
All regressions include year and firm fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year level. Diff 
captures the difference between Low and High estimates in Panels A to C and With Proposal and Without Proposal in Panels 
D to G. We report p-values in parentheses. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 
Lending Variable Low 
 
High Diff (P-value) 
Panel A: Corporate Governance 
SUPPLY 
-2.446*** -1.727*** -0.719*** 
(0.252) (0.183) (0.000) 
ONLOAN 0.188*** 0.155*** 0.033 
(0.055) (0.023) (0.575) 
Panel B: Previous Twelve Month Returns 
SUPPLY -2.145*** -1.912*** -0.233** 
 (0.251) (0.179) (0.029) 
ONLOAN 0.229*** 0.106*** 0.123 
 (0.037) (0.026) (0.004) 
Panel C: Size 
SUPPLY  -3.155*** -1.255*** -1.900*** 
 (0.315) (0.117) (0.000) 
ONLOAN 0.152*** 0.168*** -0.026 
 (0.043) (0.022) (0.670) 
    
Lending Variable With Proposal 
 
Without Proposal Diff (P-value) 
Panel D: Non-Routine 
SUPPLY  -2.307*** -2.188*** -0.119* 
 (0.235) (0.215) (0.077) 
ONLOAN 0.161*** 0.176*** -0.015 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.498) 
Panel E: Compensation-related 
SUPPLY  -2.608*** -2.184*** -0.424*** 
 (0.269) (0.219) (0.009) 
ONLOAN 0.153* 0.153*** 0.001 
 (0.093) (0.033) (0.994) 
Panel F: G-Index 
SUPPLY  -2.666*** -2.394*** -0.272* 
 (0.413) (0.317) (0.084) 
ONLOAN 0.074 0.093* -0.019 
 (0.062) (0.051) (0.806) 
Panel G: Mergers and Proxy Contests 
SUPPLY  -2.774*** -1.995*** -0.779** 
 -0.400 -0.265 (0.032) 
ONLOAN 0.306** 0.183* 0.123 
 (0.149) (0.095) (0.188)  
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Table 8 
Voting Outcome  
 
The table presents results from a regressions analysis of voting outcome for non-routine proposals. The dependent variable 
is VOTES FOR, the percentage of votes FOR the proposal. NON ROUTINE proposals are defined by NYSE Rule 452 as 
those in which broker voting is not allowed.  Columns (1) – (2) present results for all voting; Column (3) presents results 
only for mutual funds voting. The independent variables are: ΔSUPPLY and ΔONLOAN, the change in lendable supply and 
on loan from days (t=-30 to -20) to record date (t=0). DSHR is a dummy equal to one if shareholders sponsor the proposal, 
zero otherwise. DISS is a dummy equal to 1 when management is in favor and ISS is against the proposal. DSHR equals one 
for shareholder-sponsored proposals. G-INDEX, COMP and CORP CONTROL are, respectively, dummies for anti-takeover, 
compensation and merger/proxy contest related proposals All estimations include proposal fixed effects and firm-level 
controls. Control variables include governance (GOV41), institutional ownership (INST), concentration of institutional 
ownership as measured by the Herfindahl index (INST CONC), the natural logarithm of market capitalization (SIZE), book 
to market (BM), stock turnover (TURNOVER), bid-ask spread (SPREAD), a small firm dummy (PRICE<$5), and prior 
twelve-month return (RETURN). All regressions include year and firm fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level (firm-record date level in column (3)), presented in parentheses. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1% 
(5%, 10%) level. 
 Dependent Variable: % of Votes FOR proposal 
 All Voting Voting by Mutual Funds 
  (1) (2) (3) 
ΔSUPPLY 0.350* -0.103 -0.795** 
  (0.218) (0.333) (0.322) 
ΔONLOAN 0.151 0.711  
  (0.413) (0.726)  
DISS  -19.831*** -49.218*** 
   (1.182) (0.798) 
COMP   11.050*** 0.133 
    (0.982) (0.702) 
G-INDEX   11.297*** 9.984*** 
    (1.409) (1.514) 
CORP CONTROL  9.333*** 9.393*** 
   (2.095) (1.175) 
DSHR -43.595*** -42.660*** -36.987*** 
  (1.781) (1.761) (0.961) 
ΔSUPPLY * DISS  1.545*** 1.178*** 
   (0.395) (0.272) 
ΔSUPPLY * COMP  1.859*** 0.466* 
   (0.445) (0.304) 
ΔSUPPLY * G-INDEX  1.642*** 1.233** 
   (0.550) (0.593) 
ΔSUPPLY * CORP CONT  2.131** 0.380 
   (0.870) (0.406) 
ΔSUPPLY * DSHR -2.444*** -1.997*** 0.162 
  (0.556) (0.569) (0.342) 
ΔONLOAN * DISS  -2.269**  
  (0.952)  
ΔONLOAN * COMP  -0.989   
   (1.151)   
ΔONLOAN * G-INDEX   -1.632   
    (1.429)   
ΔONLOAN * CORP CONT   -0.644   
    (1.907)   
ΔONLOAN * DSHR 0.280 0.320   
  (1.563) (1.641)   
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Family FE No No Yes 
Observations 6,887 6,887 1,524,290 
Adjusted R2 0.599 0.727 0.791 
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Appendix A: Figures 
How Does Equity Lending Work? 
 
Figure A1 
 
 
 
Beneficial 
Owners 
Lending 
Agent 
 
PIMCO 
Borrower 
 
GS 
Cash Investment Vehicle 
A fund within one 
of the lending 
agents (e.g., 
PIMCO Total 
Return Fund) 
US Securities $100 US Securities $100 
Collateral $102 
Mark-to-Market 
Collateral 
Dividends & other  
entitlements 
Dividends & other  
entitlements 
 Borrower leaves collateral with lending agent (e.g., State Street) and pays a fee for the loan. 
 Lender still receives dividends but loses voting rights; borrower gets voting rights.  
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Appendix A: Tables 
Table AI 
Cash Flows on a Securities Loan with Cash Collateral 
 
Settlement date June 30th 
Term Open 
Security XYZ Limited 
Security price $10.00 per share 
Quantity 100,000 shares 
Loan value $1,000,000.00 
Rebate rate 80 basis points 
Collateral Cash 
Margin required 2% 
Collateral required  $1,020,000.00 
Reinvestment rate 130 basis points 
Daily lending income $13.97 ($1,020,000.00 * 0.005 * (1/365)) 
Daily Rebate $22.36 ($1,020,000 * 0.008 * (1/365)) 
 
Assumption: No change in value, therefore no change due to daily mark to market, and no change in terms. 
 
Payments to the borrower: 
On July 30th $670.80 ($22.36 * 30 days) 
 
Profit for the lender: 
On July 30th $419.10 ($13.97 * 30 days)  
 
Source: Adapted from “An Introduction to Securities Lending,” Spitalfields Advisors Limited, 2006.  
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1 The record date determines the ownership date for voting purposes. The record date is set prior to the date of the shareholder 
meeting, when the voting takes place. Most states (for example, California and Delaware) require that the record date be set at a 
maximum of 60 days and a minimum of ten days prior to the meeting; New York sets the maximum at 50 days. 
2 We use the terms recall and restrict interchangeably, capturing both recall of shares actually on loan, and restriction on shares 
available to lend that that have not been borrowed. 
3 Edmans (2014) surveys the literature on blockholders and discusses the different incentives and costs faced by blockholders when 
deciding how to exert governance. 
4 The securities lending process is shown graphically, and with a numerical example of cash flows and fees in Appendix A. 
5 See Hu and Black (2006) for a discussion of empty voting. 
6 See http://www.riskmetrics.com/press/articles/040307boardiq.html 
7 See https://content.putnam.com/shared/pdf/proxy_voting_guidelines.pdf 
8 See http://www.tiaa-cref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp/documents/document/tiaa01007871.pdf 
9 See http://www.riskmetrics.com/press/articles/040307boardiq.html 
10 We thank securities lending practitioners at J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs for helping us understand industry practices for 
recalling and restricting lendable shares. 
11 Hu and Black (2008) discuss the case of Fidelity and Morgan Stanley, who together held 10% shares of Telecom Italia and led a 
campaign against a takeover of Pirelli. However, they were only able to vote 1% of the shares because the remaining shares were lent 
out and could not be called in in time for the vote. The Pirelli bid was approved. 
12 See Bushee (1998, 2001), Bushee, Carter, and Gerakos (2013), and Chen, Harford, and Lee (2007) for more details. 
13 Our conclusions based on groups (2) to (5) are unaffected if we use total ownership instead of blockholdings. 
14 Note that we also must have a first-stage equation for RDATE*FEE because the product of an endogenous variable (FEE) and an 
exogenous variable (RDATE) is still endogenous (see Wooldridge (2001)). 
15 Note that a reduction in lendable supply includes both the actual recall of shares that are on loan and a reduction in shares made 
available to lend. 
16 There is a large body of research in the labor economics literature with event studies of regulatory changes on labor supply. For 
example, Eissa and Liebman (1996), Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Eissa and Hoynes (2004), 
Blau and Kahn (2007), and Rothstein (2010) study the sensitivity of tax changes on labor supply and market participation. Blundell 
and Macurdy (1999) provides a comprehensive survey of the labor supply literature. 
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17 In contrast to the activity around voting record dates, we find that around the time of the ex-dividend record date, there is a 
statistically and economically significant increase in borrowing demand, with little change in the supply of lendable shares. 
18 A similar concept has been used in many fields, such as health care (e.g., Hall and Jones (2007), and Becker and Elias (2007)), 
marketing (e.g., Miller et al. (2011)) and environmental studies (e.g., Hanemann (1994) and Kling et al. (2012)). For example, Becker 
and Elias (2007) estimate the following in their study of organ donations: “How much pay is required to induce an individual to sell 
an organ? We estimate the value or price of an organ from living donors by computing how much additional income or market 
consumption an individual will require to be indifferent between selling an organ or not.”. 
19 For example, BlackRock has a team of 20 professionals dedicated to corporate governance in eight offices globally (Corporate 
Governance & Responsible Investment Report, BlackRock, 2013). 
20 FOR is defined as the percentage of number of FOR votes, relative to the base by which the proposal is decided. The base varies by 
proposal, and can be the sum of FOR, AGAINST, and ABSTAIN votes, the sum of FOR and AGAINST votes, or the number of 
shares outstanding, for example. 
21 We present OLS estimations to ensure that distributional assumptions do not unduly affect our results (Angrist and Pischke (2009)). 
The results are robust to employing logit estimations. 
22 https://advisors.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/advisor/researchcommentary/article/IWE_InvResSecuritiesLending 
 
